Abstract. This paper proposes a new public key authenticated encryption (signcryption) scheme based on the Diffie-Hellman problem in Gap Diffie-Hellman groups. This scheme is built on the scheme proposed by Boneh, Lynn and Shacham in 2001 to produce short signatures. The idea is to introduce some randomness into this signature to increase its level of security in the random oracle model and to re-use that randomness to perform encryption. This results in a signcryption protocol that is more efficient than any combination of that signature with an El Gamal like encryption scheme. The new scheme is also shown to satisfy really strong security notions and its strong unforgeability is tightly related to the Diffie-Hellman assumption in Gap Diffie-Hellman groups.
Introduction
The concept of public key signcryption schemes was proposed by Zheng in 1997 ( [43] ). The purpose of this kind of primitive is to perform encryption and signature in a single logical step in order to obtain confidentiality, integrity, authentication and non-repudiation more efficiently than the sign-then-encrypt approach. The drawback of this latter solution is to expand the final ciphertext size (this could be impractical for low bandwidth networks) and increase the sender and receiver's computing time. Several efficient signcryption schemes have been proposed since 1997. The original schemes proposed in [43] , [44] were based on the discrete logarithm problem but no security proofs were given. Zheng's original construction was only proven secure in 2002 ( [3] ) by Baek et al. who described a formal security model in a multi-user setting. In 2000, Steinfeld and Zheng ([41] ) proposed another scheme for which the unforgeability of ciphertexts relies on the intractability of the factoring problem but they provided no proof of chosen ciphertext security.
The drawback of the previously cited solutions is that they do not offer easy non-repudiation of ciphertexts: a recipient cannot prove to a third party that some plaintext was actually signcrypted by the sender. Bao and Deng ( [5] ) proposed a method to add universal verifiability to Zheng's cryptosystem but their scheme was shown ( [39] ) to leak some information about the plaintext as other schemes described in [42] and [31] . The latter schemes can easily be modified to fix their problem but no strong guarantee of unforgeability can be obtained currently. In the discrete logarithm setting, another scheme was shown in [39] to be chosen ciphertext secure under the Gap Diffie-Hellman assumption. It was a signcryption scheme built on a modified version of the DSA signature scheme which is not provably secure currently. As a consequence, no proof of unforgeability could be found for that scheme. An RSA-based scheme was described by Malone-Lee and Mao ( [32] ) who provided proofs for both unforgeability under chosen-message attacks and chosen ciphertext security. Unfortunately, they only considered a security in a single-user setting rather than the more realistic multi-user setting. Furthermore, the security of that scheme is only loosely related to the RSA assumption. However, none of these schemes is provably secure against insider attacks: in some of them, an attacker learning some user's private key can recover all messages previously signcrypted by that user while some others are only proven secure against outsider attacks.
In 2002, An et al. ( [1] ) presented an approach consisting in performing signature and encryption in parallel: a plaintext is first transformed into a pair (c,
Once he completed the transformation, the signer can jointly sign c and encrypt d in parallel using appropriate encryption and signature schemes. The de-signcryption operation is then achieved by the recipient in a parallel fashion: the signature on c is verified while d is decrypted and the pair (c, d) is then used to recover the plaintext. This method decreases the computation time to signcrypt a message to the maximum of the times required by the underlying encryption and signature processes. This parallel approach was further investigated by Pieprzyk and Pointcheval ([35] ) who proposed to use a (2, 2)-Shamir secret sharing as a commitment scheme: a plaintext is first splitted into two shares s 1 , s 2 which do not individually reveal any information on m. s 1 is used as a commitment and signed while s 2 is encrypted as a de-commitment. The authors of [35] also gave a construction allowing them to integrate any one-way encryption system (such as the basic RSA) with a weakly secure signature (non-universally forgeable signatures in fact) into a chosen ciphertext secure and existentially unforgeable signcryption scheme. Dodis et al. ([20] ) recently proposed another technique to perform parallel signcryption. Their method consists in a Feistel probabilistic two-paddings (called PSEP for short) which can be viewed as a generalization of other existing probabilistic paddings (OAEP, OAEP+, PSS-R,etc.) and involve a particular kind of commitment schemes. The authors of [20] showed that their construction also allows optimal exact security, flexible key management, compatibility with PKCS standards and has other interesting properties. On the other hand, all parallel signcryption propositions require the recipient of a message to know from whom a ciphertext emanates before beginning to verify the signature in parallel with the decryption operation. A trivial solution to this problem is to append a tag containing the sender's identity to the ciphertext but this prevents the scheme from satisfying the notion of ciphertext anonymity formalized by Boyen in [14] (intuitively, this notion expresses the inability for someone observing a ciphertext to determine who the sender is nor to whom it is intended) that can be a desirable feature in many applications (see [14] for examples). Furthermore, by the same arguments as those in [7] , one can easily notice that the probabilistic padding described in [20] does not allow the key privacy property to be achieved when instantiated with trapdoor permutations such as RSA, Rabin or Paillier: in these cases, given a ciphertext and a set of public keys, it is possible to determine under which key the message was encrypted. An anonymous trapdoor permutation or a repeated variant of the padding PSEP (as the solutions proposed in [7] ) could be used to solve this problem but this would decrease the scheme's efficiency.
In this paper, we propose a new discrete logarithm based signcryption scheme which satisfies strong security notions: chosen ciphertext security against insider attacks (except the hybrid composition proposed in [27] and the identity based scheme described in [14] , no discrete logarithm based authenticated encryption method was formally proven secure in such a model before), strong unforgeability against chosen-message attacks, ciphertext anonymity in the sense of [14] (this is an extension of the notion of key privacy proposed in [7] to the signcryption case). We also prove that it satisfies a new security notion that is related to the one of ciphertext anonymity and that we call 'key invisibility'. We show that the scheme's strong unforgeability is really tightly related to the hardness of the Diffie-Hellman problem unlike the scheme proposed in [14] whose proof of unforgeability relies on Pointcheval and Stern's forking lemma and thus only provides a loose reduction to a computational problem. In fact, except the hybrid construction of [27] (whose semantic security is based on the stronger hash oracle DiffieHellman assumption) our scheme appears to be the first discrete logarithm based signcryption protocol whose (strong) unforgeabililty is proven to be tightly related to the Diffie-Hellman problem. About the semantic security of the scheme, we give heuristic arguments showing that it is more tightly related to the Diffie-Hellman problem than expressed by the bounds at first sight. Unlike [1] , [20] and [35] , our protocol is sequential but it is efficient and does not require the recipient of a message to know who is the sender before starting the de-signcryption process. Our scheme borrows a construction due to Boyen ([14] ) and makes extensive use of the properties of some bilinear maps over the so-called Gap Diffie-Hellman groups (in fact, the structure of these groups is also exploited in our security proofs). Before describing our scheme, we first recall the properties of these maps in section 2. The section 3 formally describes the security notions that our scheme, depicted in section 4, is shown to satisfy in the security analysis presented in section 5.
Preliminaries

Overview of pairings
Let k be a security parameter and q be a k−bit prime number. Let us consider groups G 1 and G 2 of the same prime order q. For our purposes, we need a bilinear mapê :
satisfying the following properties:
there is an efficient algorithm to computeê(P, Q) ∀ P, Q ∈ G 1 .
Modified pairings ( [10] ) obtained from the Weil or the Tate pairing provide admissible maps of this kind. The group G 1 is a cyclic subgroup of the group of points of a suitable elliptic curve E(F p ) over a finite field while G 2 is a cyclic subgroup of the multiplicative group associated to a finite extension of F p . We refer to [33] or [9] for a detailed description of the Weil pairings and to [25] for the Tate pairing. We now recall some problems that provided underlying assumptions for many previously proposed pairing based cryptosystems. These problems are formalized according to the elliptic curve additive notation. Definition 1. Given groups G 1 and G 2 of prime order q, a bilinear mapê :
-The Computational Diffie-Hellman problem (CDH) in G 1 is, given P, aP, bP for unknown a, b ∈ Z q , to compute abP ∈ G 1 . -The Decisional Diffie-Hellman problem (DDH) is, given P, aP, bP, cP for unknown a, b, c ∈ Z q , to decide whether ab ≡ c (mod q) or not. Tuples of the form P, aP, bP, cP for which the latter condition is verified are called "Diffie-Hellman tuples". -The Gap Diffie-Hellman problem (GDH) is to solve a given instance P, aP, bP of the CDH problem with the help of a DDH oracle that is able to decide whether a tuple P, a ′ P, b ′ P, c ′ P is such that c ′ ≡ a ′ b ′ (mod q) or not.
As shown in [28] , a pairing can implement a DDH oracle. Indeed, in a group G 1 for which pairings are efficiently computable, to determine whether a tuple P, aP, bP, cP is a valid DiffieHellman tuple or not, it suffices to check ifê(P, cP ) =ê(aP, bP ). This kind of group, where the DDH problem is easy while the CDH one is still believed to be hard, is called Gap Diffie-Hellman groups in the literature ( [28] , [34] ).
Security notions for signcryption schemes
We first recall the two usual security notions: the security against chosen ciphertext attacks which is also called semantic security and the unforgeability against chosen-message attacks. We then consider other security notions that were proposed by Boyen ([14] ) in 2003. In the notion of chosen ciphertext security, we consider a multi-user security model as already done in [1] , [3] , [20] , [35] and [14] to allow the adversary to query the de-signcryption oracle on ciphertexts created with other private keys than the attacked one. We also consider the security against insider attacks by allowing the attacker to choose to be challenged on a signcrypted text created by a corrupted user (i.e. a user whose private key is known to the attacker). Indeed, for confidentiality purposes, we require the owner of a private key to be unable to find any information on a ciphertext created with that particular key without knowing which randomness was used to produce that ciphertext. This further allows us to show that an attacker stealing a private key does not threaten the confidentiality of messages previously signcrypted using that private key 1 .
Definition 2. We say that a signcryption scheme is semantically secure against chosen ciphertext attacks (we call this security notion SC-IND-CCA) if no probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary has a non-negligible advantage in the following game:
1. The challenger runs the key generation algorithm Keygen to generate a private/public key pair (sk U , pk U ). sk U is kept secret while pk U is given to the adversary A.
2.
A performs a first series of queries in a first stage. These queries can be of the following kinds: -Signcryption queries: A produces a message m ∈ M and an arbitrary public key pk R (that public key may differ from pk U ) and requires the result Signcrypt(m, sk U , pk R ) of the signcryption oracle. -De-signcryption queries: A produces a ciphertext σ and requires the result of the operation De-signcryt(σ, sk U ). This result is made of a signed plaintext and a sender's public key if the obtained signed-plaintext is valid for the recovered sender's public key. Otherwise (that is if the obtained plaintext-signature pair is not valid for the obtained public key when performing the de-signcryption operation with the private key sk U ), the ⊥ symbol is returned as a result. These queries can be asked adaptively: each query may depend on the answers to previous ones. 3. A produces two plaintexts m 0 , m 1 ∈ M of equal size and an arbitrary private key sk S . The challenger flips a coin b ← R {0, 1} to compute a signcryption σ = Signcrypt(m b , sk S , pk U ) of m b with the sender's private key sk S under the attacked receiver's public key pk U . σ is sent to A as a challenge. 4. The adversary performs new queries as in the first stage. Now, it may not ask the designcryption of the challenge σ with the private key sk U of the attacked receiver. A's advantage is defined to be
In the notion of unforgeability captured by the formal definition below, as in many other proposed provably unforgeable signcryption schemes ( [1] , [3] , [14] , [20] , [27] , [35] , etc.), we allow a forger attempting to forge a ciphertext on behalf of the attacked user U to know the receiver's private key. In fact, the attacker has to come with the intended receiver's private key sk R as a part of the forgery. The motivation is to prove that no attacker can forge a ciphertext intended to any receiver on behalf of a given sender. In particular, no dishonest user can produce a ciphertext intended to himself and try to convince a third party that it emanates from a honest user.
Definition 3. We say that a signcryption scheme is strongly existentially unforgeable against chosen-message attacks (SC-SUF-CMA) if no PPT adversary has a non-negligible advantage in the following game:
1. The challenger generates a key pair (sk U , pk U ) and pk U is given to the forger F. 2. The forger F performs queries to the oracles Signcrypt sk U (., .) and De-signcrypt sk U (.)
exactly as in the previous definition. Again, these queries can also be produced adaptively. 3. At the end of the game, F produces a ciphertext σ and a key pair (sk R , pk R ) and wins the game if the result of the operation De-signcrypt(σ, sk R ) is a tuple (m, s, pk U ) such that (m, s) is a valid signature for the public key pk U such that σ was not the output of a signcryption query Signcrypt(m, sk U , pk R ) made during the game.
Recall that, in the corresponding notion of conventional (i.e. non-strong) unforgeability for signcryption schemes, the attacker cannot win if the outputted ciphertext was the result of any signcryption query. In our context, as in [1] , [27] , [20] , and many other works, the forger is allowed to have obtained the forged ciphertext as the result of a signcryption query for a different receiver's public key than the one corresponding to the claimed forgery. The only constraint is that, for the message m obtained by de-signcryption of the alleged forgery with the chosen private key sk R , the outputted ciphertext σ was not obtained as the result of a Signcrypt(m, sk U , pk R ) query.
In [14] , Boyen also proposed additional security notions for signcryption schemes. One of the most important ones was the notion of ciphertext anonymity that can be viewed as an extension to authenticated encryption schemes of the notion of key privacy already considered by Bellare et al in [7] . Intuitively, in the context of public key encryption, a scheme is said to have the key privacy property if ciphertexts convey no information about the public key that was used to create them. In the signcryption setting, we say that the ciphertext anonymity (or key privacy) property is satisfied if ciphertexts contain no information about who created them nor about to whom they are intended. This notion is a transposition into the non-identity based setting of the one presented in [14] . It can be described like that. Definition 4. We say that a signcryption scheme satisfies the ciphertext anonymity property (also called key privacy or key indistinguishability: we call this notion SC-INDK-CCA for short) if no PPT distinguisher has a non-negligible advantage in the following game:
1. The challenger generates two private/public key pairs (sk R,0 , pk R,0 ) and (sk R,1 , pk R,1 ). pk R,0 and pk R,1 are given to the distinguisher D. 2. D adaptively performs queries Signcrypt(m, sk R,c , pk R ), for arbitrary recipient keys pk R , and De-signcrypt(σ, sk R,c ) for c = 0 or c = 1. 
Again, this notion captures the security against insider attacks since the distinguisher is allowed to choose a set of two private keys among which the one used as sender's key to create the challenge ciphertext is picked by the challenger. The above definition can be viewed as a transposition to the non-identity based setting of the definition of ciphertext anonymity proposed by Boyen ([14] ) as well as an extension of the definition of key privacy ( [7] ) to the authenticated encryption context. We introduce another notion called 'key invisibility' which is close to the concept (formalized by Galbraith and Mao in [23] ) of invisibility for undeniable signatures. Intuitively, this notion expresses the impossibility to decide whether a given ciphertext was actually created using a given particular sender's private key and a given particular receiver's public key.
Definition 5. We say that a signcryption scheme satisfies the key invisibility (we denote this notion by SC-INVK-CCA for short) if no PPT distinguisher has a non-negligible advantage in the following game:
1. The challenger generates a private/public key pair (sk U , pk U ). pk U is given to the distinguisher D. 2. D adaptively performs queries Signcrypt(m, sk U , pk R ), for arbitrary recipient keys pk R , and
De-signcrypt(σ, sk U ). 
Again, we allow the distinguisher to choose which private key is used as a part of the challenge to take insider attacks into account. Galbraith and Mao ( [23] ) showed that anonymity and invisibility are essentially equivalent security notions for undeniable signatures. While one can prove in the same way that key privacy and key invisibility are also essentially equivalent for some particular encryption schemes, such an equivalence turns out to be unclear in the signcryption case. In fact, one cannot prove that a distinguisher against the key invisibility implies a distinguisher against the key privacy with the same advantage (because two random coins are used by the challenger in the definition of key privacy and a single one for key anonymity). However, we can prove that, for signcryption schemes satisfying some particular properties (that is, for a given message and a given sender's private key, the output of the signcryption algorithm must be uniformly distributed in the ciphertext space when the receiver's public key is random), we can prove that key invisibility implies key privacy. In the next section we propose a scheme that satisfies both of them (in addition to the usual notions of semantic security and unforgeability) in the random oracle model.
A Diffie-Hellman based signcryption scheme with key privacy
This section presents a signcryption scheme whose unforgeability under chosen-message attacks is tightly related to the hardness of the computational Diffie-Hellman problem in Gap DiffieHellman groups. Our solution relies on the BLS signature (proposed in [11] and recalled in appendix) whose security is enhanced by a random quantity U which is used for encryption purposes but also acts as a random salt to provide a tighter security reduction to the DiffieHellman problem in G 1 in the proof of unforgeability.
We assume that both the sender and the receiver agreed on public parameters: security parameters k and ℓ, cyclic groups G 1 and G 2 of prime order q ≥ 2 k such that ℓ is the number of bits required to represent elements of G 1 , a generator P of G 1 and a bilinear mapê :
1 → {0, 1} ℓ and H 3 : {0, 1} ℓ → {0, 1} n+ℓ where n denotes the size of plaintexts (i.e. the message space is M = {0, 1} n ). The scheme consists of the following three algorithms (we recall that the symbol ⊕ denotes the bitwise exclusive OR).
Keygen: user u picks a random x u ← R Z q and sets his public key to Y u = x u P ∈ G 1 . His private key is x u . We will denote the sender and the receiver respectively by u = S and u = R and their key pair by (x S , Y S ) and (x R , Y R ). Signcrypt: to signcrypt a plaintext m ∈ {0, 1} n intended to R, the sender S uses the following procedure 1. Pick a random r ← R Z q and compute
, 1} ℓ and then scramble the plaintext together with the sender's public key:
The ciphertext is given by σ = U, W, Z ∈ G 1 × {0, 1} n+2ℓ .
De-signcrypt: when receiving a ciphertext σ = U, W, Z , the receiver R has to perform the steps below:
is not a point on the curve on which G 1 is defined. The consistency of the scheme is easy to verifiy. To prove to a third party that the sender S actually signed a plaintext m, the receiver just has to forward it m and (U, V, Y R ). The third party can then compute H as in the step 3 of unsigncrypt and perform the signature verification as in the same step 3. We note that, in the signcryption algorithm, the recipient's public key must be hashed together with the pair (m, U ) in order to achieve the provable strong unforgeability (as shown in the proof of theorem 2). As pointed out in [24] , in some applications, it is interesting for the origin of a signcrypted text to be publicly verifiable (by firewalls for example). In some other applications, it is undesirable: indeed as explained in [14] , in some cases, it is better for a signcrypted text not to convey any information about its sender nor about its intended receiver. This property, called anonymity of ciphertexts, is provided by the above scheme as will be shown in the next section.
From an efficiency point of view, we can easily verifiy that the above scheme is at least as efficient and more compact than any sequential composition of the BLS signature ( [11] ) with any other Diffie-Hellman based chosen ciphertext secure encryption scheme ( [2] , [4] , [19] , [21] , [22] , [36] , [40] ): indeed only three scalar multiplications in G 1 are required for the signcryption operation while 1 multiplication and 2 pairings must be performed in the de-signcryption process. A sequential combination of the BLS signature with the encryption scheme proposed in [2] would involve an additional multiplication at decryption. If we take ℓ ≈ k ≥ 160 (by working with an appropriate elliptic curve), we see that ciphertexts are about 480 bits longer than plaintexts.
Any
Security Analysis
In this section, we first show that an adversary against the SC-IND-CCA security of the scheme implies a PPT algorithm that can solve the Diffie-Hellman problem in G 1 with high probability. This fact is formalized by the following theorem.
Hash queries on H 2 and H 3 are treated in the usual way: B first checks in the corresponding list if the oracle's value was already defined at the queried point. If it was, B returns the defined value. Otherwise, it returns an uniformly chosen random element from the appropriate range and updates the corresponding list. When a hash query H 1 (m, U, Y R ) is performed, B first looks if the value of H 1 was previously defined for the input (m, U, Y R ). If it was, the previously defined value is returned. Otherwise, B picks a random t ← R Z q , returns tP ∈ G 1 as an answer and inserts the tuple (m, U, Y R , t) into L 1 . Now, let us see how signcryption and de-signcryption queries are dealt with:
-For a signcryption query on a plaintext m with a recipient's public key Y R both chosen by the adversary A, B first picks a random r ← R Z q , computes U = rP ∈ G 1 and checks if L 1 contains a tuple (m, U, Y R , t) indicating that H 1 (m, U, Y R ) was previously defined to be tP . If no such tuple is found, B picks a random t ← R Z q and puts the entry (m, U, Y R , t) into L 1 . B then computes V = tY u = t(bP ) ∈ G 1 for the random t chosen or recovered from L 1 . The rest follows as in the normal signcryption process: B computes rY R (for the Y R specified by the adversary), runs the H 2 simulation process to obtain At the end of the first stage, A outputs two plaintexts m 0 and m 1 together with an arbitrary sender's private key x S and requires a challenge ciphertext built under the recipient's public key Y u . B ignores m 0 and m 1 and randomly picks two binary strings W ← R {0, 1} ℓ and Z ← R {0, 1} n+ℓ . A challenge ciphertext σ = U, W, Z = aP, W, Z is then sent to A that then performs a second series of queries at a second stage. These queries are handled by B as those at the first stage. As done in many other papers in the literature, it is easy to show that A will not realize that σ is not a valid signcryption for the sender's private key x S and the public key Y u unless it asks for the hash value H 2 (aP, bP, abP ). In that case, the solution of the DiffieHellman problem would be inserted in L 2 exactly at that moment and it does not matter if the simulation of A's view is no longer perfect. At the end of the game, A produces a result which is ignored by B. The latter just looks into the list L 2 for tuples of the form (aP, bP, D i , .). For each of them, B checks whetherê(P, D i ) = e(aP, bP ) and, if this relation holds, stops and outputs D i as a solution of the CDH problem. If no tuple of this kind satisfies the latter equality, B stops and outputs "failure". Now to assess B's probability of success, let us denote by AskH 2 the event that A asks the hash value of abP during the simulation. As done in several papers in the literature (see [40] , [10] or [14] ), as long as the simulation of the attack's environment is perfect, the probability for AskH 2 to happen is the same as in a real attack (i.e. an attack where A interacts with real oracles). In a real attack we have
and then we have
. Now, the probability that the simulation is not perfect remains to be assessed. The only case where it can happen is when a valid ciphertext is rejected in a de-signcryption query. It is easy to see that for every pair (V i , h 3,i ) in L 3 , there is exactly one pair (h 1,i , h 2,i ) of elements in the range of oracles H 1 and H 2 providing a valid ciphertext. The probability to reject a valid ciphertext is thus not greater than q H 3 /2 2k . The bound on B's computation time derives from the fact that every de-signcryption query requires at most 4 pairing evaluations while the extraction of the solution from L 2 implies to compute at most 2q H 2 pairings.
The above security proof makes use of the pairing's bilinearity to handle de-signcryption queries and thus avoids the use of constructions such as [2] , [36] , [22] , [21] that would increase the ciphertext's length or imply additional computation in the de-signcryption operation. This results in a worst-case bound on algorithm B's computation time that seems to be quite loose: to extract the solution of the CDH problem, B might have to compute up to 2q H 2 pairings if A only queries oracle H 2 on tuples of the form (aP, bP, .). If we allow up to 2 60 H 2 -queries, this appears to be a loose bound at first sight. But we stress that, heuristically, A has really no interest in asking hash queries on tuples (aP, bP, .) that are not valid Diffie-Hellman tuples: indeed, since we work with Gap Diffie-Hellman groups, A is able to decide himself whether a given tuple (aP, bP, cP ) is a valid one or not and, since hash functions are indistinguishable from true random functions from its point of view, it can gain no information by querying H 2 on invalid tuples. Furthermore, one can argue that an attacker A querying H 2 on many invalid tuples without checking the validity of these tuples would have no better strategy to find information about the plaintext than computing the XOR of the ciphertext's W -component with random binary strings. Such a strategy would not be more efficient for A than an exhaustive search of the solution to the Diffie-Hellman instance embedded in the challenge ciphertext. An attacker having a non-negligible advantage against the semantic security would ask much less than 2 60 (useless) hash values of invalid Diffie-Hellman tuple. We can thus expect that, at the end of the simulation, L 2 only contains a limited number of entries (aP, bP, .). We note that the bound on B's probability of success is tight: if we allow q DSC ≤ 2 30 and q H 3 ≤ 2 60 , with k ≥ 160, we obtain q H 3 q DSC /2 2k ≤ 2 −230 which is a negligible function of the parameter k.
We point out that a pairing can be used here to extract the solution to the Diffie-Hellman problem because there is a checking of the ciphertext's validity at the decryption and ciphertexts submitted to the de-signcryption oracle can thus be rejected if the appropriate H 2 query has not been previously performed. A similar trick cannot be used to prove the security of the El Gamal type encryption, consisting in simply taking the XOR of the plaintext with the hash value of an ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key, without applying any padding to the scheme in such a way that its validity can be checked at decryption.
The following theorem claims the strong unforgeability of the scheme.
Theorem 2.
In the random oracle model, if there exists an adversary F that has a nonnegligible advantage ǫ against the SC-SUF-CMA security of the scheme when running in a time t, making q SC signcryption queries, q DSC de-signcryption queries and at most q H i queries on oracles H i (for i = 1, . . . , 4), then there exists an algorithm B that can solve the Diffie-Hellman problem in G 1 with a probability ǫ ′ > ǫ − q SC q H 1 /2 k − q DSC q H 3 /2 2k in a time t ′ < t + 4q DSC t e where t e denotes the time required for a pairing evaluation.
Proof. given in appendix.
This time, we obtain bounds that are explicitly tight. With k ≥ 160, if we allow q H 3 < 2 60 and q H 1 < 2 50 (recall that hashing onto an elliptic curve may not be considered as an operation of unit cost since it requires some extra computation when compared to hashing onto a finite field, see [6] for details), q DSC < 2 30 we have q SC q H 1 /2 k < 1/2 80 and we still have q DSC q H 3 < 2 −230 . We thus have a negligible degradation of B's probability of success when compared to the adversary's advantage. The bound on B's running time is also reasonably tight for q DSC < 2 30 . We now give a proof in the random oracle model that the scheme satisfies the notion of ciphertext anonymity described in section 3.
Theorem 3.
In the random oracle model, assume there exists a PPT distinguisher D that has a non-negligible advantage against the SC-INDK-CCA security of the scheme when running in a time t, performing q SC signcryption queries, q DSC de-signcryption queries and q H i queries to oracle H i (for i = 1, . . . , 4). Then there exists an algorithm B that solves the CDH problem with an advantage ǫ ′ > ǫ − 1/2 n+ℓ−1 − q DSC q H 3 /2 2k when running in a time t ′ < t + (4q DSC + 2q H 2 )t e where t e denotes the time required for one pairing evaluation.
Proof. given in appendix.
Again, the bound on B's computation time might seem to be meaningless but, as for the proof of theorem 1, we can argue that a distinguisher performing a great number of H 2 queries on invalid Diffie-Hellman tuples would have no better strategy than an exhaustive search for DiffieHellman instances embedded in the challenge-ciphertext. However, if we look at the proofs of semantic security and ciphertext anonymity for the scheme described in [13] , although no bound is explicitly given for the running time of solvers for the bilinear Diffie-Hellman problems, these bounds are not tighter than ours. Furthermore, the proof of ciphertext anonymity provided in [13] leads to a significant degradation of the solver's advantage when compared to the distinguisher's one. We note that similar heuristic arguments can be given about solver's running time in [13] .
Finally, we close the section related to the security analysis with the following theorem related to the key invisibility. 
in a time t ′ < t + (4q DSC + 2q H 2 )t e where t e is the time required for a pairing evaluation.
Adding ciphertext unlinkability
This section shows how to add the property of ciphertext unlinkability to the scheme. This is a notion introduced in [14] : signcryption schemes providing that property allow the receiver of a signcrypted text to convince a third party that the sender actually signed the original plaintext but without being able to convince that third party that the sender created the received ciphertext (because the receiver would be able to generate the ciphertext himself from the signature thanks to his private key) and without even disclosing any information that could allow the third party to establish a link between the observed signature and the ciphertext. The public parameters are the same as above but an additional hash function
Keygen: user U picks a random x u ← R Z q and sets his public key to Y u = x u P ∈ G 1 . His private key is x u . We will denote the sender and the receiver respectively by u = s and u = r and their key pair by (x S , Y S ) and (x R , Y R ). Signcrypt: to signcrypt a plaintext m ∈ {0, 1} n intended to R, the sender S proceeds like this:
2. Pick a random r ← R Z q and compute U = rP ∈ G 1 and then
De-signcrypt: to de-signcrypt a ciphertext σ = U, W, Z , the receiver R follows the procedure below:
If the obtained V is not a point on the curve on which G 1 is built, reject the ciphertext σ.
does not hold, reject the ciphertext.
In that scheme, we also have the non-repudiation of signatures: the receiver can still forward the de-signcrypted plaintext m and the tuple (U ′ , V, Y R ) that can be checked to be a valid signature on m but, furthermore, as in [14] , the receiver R is unable to prove that S actually created the ciphertext σ since his knowledge of x R allows him to produce the encryption of the signature himself. The above scheme thus provides detachable signatures that are unlinkable to ciphertexts. We note that a single additional multiplication in G 1 is required for signcryption and de-signcryption operations to add this feature to the scheme. This unfortunately implies an additional term on the bound of Diffie-Hellman solver's running time in the security proofs (which are omitted here because of space limitation).
Conclusions
This paper proposed a new Diffie-Hellman based signcryption scheme that satisfies strong security requirements. It turns out to be the discrete log based signcryption protocol whose unforgeability is the most tightly related to the Diffie-Hellman problem (except the construction in [27] , all other existing ones are built on signatures having security proof relying on the forking lemma or on signatures for which no security proof exists and the CCA-security of [27] relies on stronger assumptions than the present scheme's semantic security). By heuristic arguments, we argued that the reduction from an adaptive chosen ciphertext adversary to a solver for the Diffie-Hellman problem is also efficient. We also introduced a new notion of security called 'key invisibility'. This notion is close to the one of 'key indistinguishability' and is also relevant for public key encryption schemes for which it can be shown to be equivalent to the notion of 'key privacy' (provided, for a given plaintext, the output of the encryption algorithm is indistinguishable from a uniform distribution on the ciphertext space when this algorithm is run with random public keys).
We raised the open question of this equivalence in the signcryption case and we show (see the appendix C) that for signcryption schemes satisfying a particular property (namely, for a given message and a given sender's private key, the output of the signcryption algorithm must look uniformly distributed when random public keys are used), 'key invisibility' implies 'key privacy'.
The BLS signature
In this part of the appendix, we recall the scheme proposed by Boneh et al. ([11] ) in 2001 to provide 160-bit signatures using the properties of Gap Diffie-Hellman groups. This signature scheme was previously implicitly suggested in [15] , [16] and in [34] . The system makes use of a pairingê :
where G 1 is of prime order q and has a generator P , and a hash function h : {0, 1} * → G 1 .
Keygen: pick a random x ← R Z q and compute the public key Y = xP ∈ G 1 . x is the signer's private key. Sign: the signature on a message M is given by σ = xh(M ) ∈ G 1 .
Verify: to verify a signature σ on a message M , compute H = h(M ) ∈ G 1 and check if (P, Y, H, σ) is a valid Diffie-Hellman tuple. To do that, it sufficies to ensure that
The signature is rejected if this condition is not satisfied.
To obtain short signatures, Boneh et al. propose to use suitable families of elliptic curves and to represent a signature by the x−coordinate of the point together with an additional bit. Similarly to the Full Domain Hash signature ( [17] ), the above one presents a security degradation for the probability of success of an algorithm solving the computational Diffie-Hellman problem when compared to an attacker's advantage in a chosen-message attack against the scheme. However, as noticed in [12] , introducing a random salt into the original BLS signature (similarly to the Probabilistic Full Domain Hash scheme depicted in [18] ) increases its length but provides it with a security that is quite tightly related to the Diffie-Hellman problem. By an analysis similar to Coron's one ( [18] ), one can show that a 30-bit random salt is sufficient to enhance the hardness of forging a signature to the same level of difficulty as solving the CDH problem. Even though a technique due to Katz and Wang ([30] ) allows removing the random salt without decreasing the security of the scheme, the randomized signature is still of interest since it provides a high level of security at the price of a 30-bit increasing in the length signatures. Recall that, except for the schemes recently proposed in [26] and [30] , all discrete logarithm based signatures either have no security proof or have a reduction from a hard computational problem obtained via the Pointcheval-Stern Forking Lemma ( [37] , [38] ). As pointed out in [26] and [30] , all security proofs relying on the latter technique present a degradation of security in the reduction.
Appendix B: security proofs
Proof of theorem 2 B receives a random instance (aP, bP ) of the Diffie-Hellman problem. It uses F as a subroutine to solve that instance and plays the role of F's challenger in the game of definition 3. It initializes F with Y u = bP as a challenge public key. F then performs adaptive queries that are handled like explained below (using lists L 1 , L 2 , L 3 as in the proof of theorem 1):
-H 2 and H 3 queries: are dealt with in the usual way as in the proof of theorem 1.
-H 1 queries: when F asks the hash value of a tuple (m, U, Y R ) that was previously queried, B returns the value defined at the first query. For a query on a new tuple (m, U, Y R ), B picks a random t ∈ Z q and defines the value of H 1 (m, U, Y R ) to be t(aP ) ∈ G 1 which is returned to F (the list L 1 is updated accordingly).
-Signcryption queries: for a signcryption query on a message and a receiver's public key Y R chosen by F, B picks a random r ∈ Z q , computes U = rP ∈ G 1 . If the value of H 1 is already defined at (m, U, Y R ), then B outputs "failure" and halts. Otherwise, B picks a random t ∈ Z q and sets H 1 (m, U, Y R ) = tP (B updates L 1 accordingly to be able to answer subsequent hash queries on the input (m, U, Y R )). At the end of the game, F produces a ciphertext U ′ , W ′ , Z ′ and a recipient's public/private key pair (x R , Y R ). At that moment, B can perform the de-signcryption using x R and, if the ciphertext is actually a valid forged ciphertext for the sender's public key Y u , B can recover the message-key pair (m ′ , Y u ) and the signature V ′ . If the hash value H 1 (m ′ , U ′ , Y R ) was not asked by F during the simulation, B outputs "failure" and stops. Otherwise, the hash value H 1 (m ′ , U ′ , Y R ) must have been defined to be t(aP ), for some t ∈ Z q which is known to B, and V ′ must be equal to t(abP ) that can then easily extract the solution t −1 V ′ of the CDH problem in G 1 . We can now assess B's probability of success. It is easy to see that the probability for B to fail in answering a signcryption query is not greater than q SC q H 1 /2 k (since at each signcryption query, there is at most q H 1 elements in L 1 and the randomly chosen r ∈ Z q is uniformly taken from a set of 2 k elements). As in the proof of theorem 1, the probability to reject a valid ciphertext is not greater than q DSC q H 3 /2 2k . It is easy to see that the probability that F succeeds in producing a forged ciphertext (U ′ , W ′ , Z ′ ) without asking the query H 1 (m ′ , U ′ , Y R ) recovered plaintext, is at most 1/2 k .
Proof of theorem 3
Let (aP, bP ) be a random instance of the CDH problem. B uses A to solve that instance and plays the role of D's challenger in the game of definition 4. To do this, B picks random elements x, y ∈ Z q and initializes D with pk R,0 = Y R,0 = x(bP ) ∈ G 1 and pk R,1 = Y R,1 = y(bP ) ∈ G 1 . D then performs queries as explained in definition 4. To deal with these queries, B maintains lists L i , for i = 1, . . . , 3 to keep track of answers to queries on random oracles H i . When oracles H 2 , H 3 are queried, B answers in the usual way by returning the previously defined value for the queried input if such a value exists and by returning a new uniformly chosen random value from the appropriate range when the queried oracle has not been defined yet at the queried input. Let us see how other queries are tackled with: -H 1 queries on an input (m, U, Y R ) are handled as in the proof of theorem 1 by picking a random t ← R Z q , inserting (m, U, Y R , t) into L 1 and returning H 1 (m, U, Y R ) = tP ∈ G 1 . -Signcryption queries: are treated exactly as in the proof of theorem 1. As in the latter, B never reaches a state of failure when handling a signcryption query. -De-signcryption queries: are also treated as in the proof of theorem 1. The probability for B to reject a valid ciphertext is also bounded by q DSC q H 3 /2 2k .
Once the first stage is finished, D outputs two sender's private key sk S,0 = x S,0 ∈ Z q , sk S,1 = x S,1 ∈ Z q and a plaintext m ∈ {0, 1} n . B ignores these outputs and sends the fake ciphertext σ = aP, W, Z , where W and Z are randomly chosen binary strings of length ℓ and n + ℓ, as a challenge to D. It is clear that, as long as D does not query H 2 to obtain the hash value of (m, aP, x(bP ), x(abP )) or (m, aP, y(bP ), y(abP )), it will not realize that σ is a fake ciphertext and the simulation will remain perfect. Moreover, in either of these two events, B can easily extract the solution abP of the CDH problem thanks to its knowledge of x and y and by computing two pairings. At the second stage, D performs queries that are handled exactly as in the first stage. Eventually, D outputs a guess (d, d ′ ) which is ignored by B that can extract the solution by itself. Suppose that the answer to a H 3 query is never Z ⊕ (m, Y S,0 ) nor Z ⊕ (m, Y S,1 ) where Z is the random string embedded into the challenge σ, Y S,0 = x S,0 P and Y S,1 = x S,1 P (we denote by BadH 3 this 'bad' event that might influence D's behaviour). Since D is assumed to have a non-negligible advantage in the real environment of attack, if BadH 3 does not occur, with high probability, it queries H 2 on (m, aP, x(bP ), x(abP )) or on (m, aP, x(bP ), y(abP )) during the simulation. Indeed, let AskH 2 denote this event. In the real attack, we have . As in theorem 1, one can easily show that, as long as the simulation is perfect (i.e. as long as a valid ciphertext is not rejected), the probability for AskH 2 to happen is the same in the simulation as in a real attack. B's probability of success is thus at least ǫ − q DSC q SC /2 2k . Its strategy to solve the CDH problem is simply to compute two pairings for each H 2 query made by D on tuples (aP, x(bP ), .) or (aP, y(bP ), .). This gives us the same bound on B's running time as the one of theorem 1.
Proof of theorem 4
Let (aP, bP ) be a random instance of the CDH problem given to B. The distinguisher D is initialized with the public key Y u = bP . It performs queries that are all handled as in the proof of theorem 3. At some time, D outputs a plaintext m ∈ {0, 1} n together with a private key x S ∈ Z q and requests a challenge from B. B then picks random binary strings W ← R {0, 1} ℓ , Z ← {0, 1} n+ℓ and sends σ = aP, W, Z as a challenge to D. As in the proof of theorem 3, D will not realize that σ is actually a fake ciphertext until it asks the hash value H 2 (aP, bP, abP ). As explained in the previous proofs, this event is very likely to happen but, since it provides B with the solution to its problem, it does not matter if the simulation is no longer perfect. Now, we can assess the probability AskH 2 that the solution to the CDH problem is asked to oracle H 2 . Let BadH 3 be the 'bad' event that Z ⊕ (m, Y S ) is the answer of a H 3 query at some time, where Y S = x S P , (we call this a 'bad' event since it might influence D's behaviour). Since D is assumed to have a non-negligible advantage in the real environment of attack, if BadH 3 does not occur, with high probability, it queries H 2 on (m, aP, bP, abP ) during the simulation. In the real attack, we have and then Pr[AskH 2 ] ≥ ǫ − 1/2 n+ℓ−1 . Since B can find the solution to the CDH instance as soon as AskH 2 happens, its probability of success is simply for AskH 2 to happen decreased by the probability for the simulation not to be perfect (i.e. for a valid ciphertext to be rejected), we obtain the same bounds on B's advantage and on its running time as in theorem 3.
